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Through the cross-sectional nature of information and
communication technologies (ICT), digitization affects almost all areas of life. Computer-aided technologization is a key feature of industrialized nations
and is having an increasing effect on (working) life all
over the world. The threat potentials are elevated by
the increasing degree of digital networking, the increasing spread and penetration of information technology (IT), and a higher degree of interactivity coupled with increasingly high-quality attacks. Previous
IT security mechanisms have reached their limits, and
reliability and controllability cannot be assumed as before [11]. These challenges affect both individuals and
organizations. Government digital agendas (see the

Federal Government of Germany or the Digital
Agenda for Europe [12]) seek to keep abreast of digital
networking and the digital changes in society.
However, information security (IS) is more comprehensive than simple IT security [32, 10]. In 2000 IT
security expert Donald Pipkin addressed all the different aspects of IS and saw the value of information assets as a key issue in business [53].
Now in its tenth year, Verizon’s 2017 Data Breach
Investigations Report1 reveals 2,000 data leaks and
shows who is hit hardest by online spying: about 20
percent of all successful attacks hit manufacturing
companies, government agencies, and educational institutions. The results of a survey on the threat posed
by ransomware conducted by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) in Germany in early 2016
suggest a more severe threat.2 More than a third of the
institutions interviewed had been affected by encryption Trojans in the past six months. In 75 percent of
these cases, the malware sneaked in via infected e-mail
attachments. For 22 percent, the infection resulted in
the significant loss of parts of their IT infrastructure.
In awareness training, in particular, it seems that
over the past fifteen years organizations have not put
their main focus on developing IS awareness and training responsible information users [78]. Verton finds
that less than 50 percent of organizations have an IT
security and training program for employees [73]. The
relevant standard for IT security is 27001 “Information
Security Management Systems” (ISMS) of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
[32]. When an ISMS is implemented, it is crucially important that the information and data protection are
properly handled and the employees are fully aware of
the consequences of misusing sensitive data [51]. In
Germany, ISO/IEC 27001 IT protection certificates
have been available since 2006 [9]. However, a survey
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Abstract
Comprehensive digitization leads to new challenges
because of cybercrime and related security countermeasures. There is no doubt that this will fundamentally affect our lives and is leading to an increase in
the importance of information security (IS). However,
technology solutions alone are not sufficient to ensure
IS countermeasures. The human side of security is important to protect organizational assets like user information and systems. The paper illustrates these relationships in terms of information security awareness
(ISA), examining its goals and the factors influencing
it through the systematic analysis and review of scientific literature and the transfer of scientific knowledge
for practical purposes. We reviewed the publications
of leading academic journals in the field of IS over the
past decade.

1. Introduction: Overcoming Digitization
Challenges
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of 424 German organizations shows that only 63 percent perform measures to raise IS awareness [2] and
40.5 percent of these organizations do not measure the
effectiveness of their trainings.
Technical solutions for IS are necessary to address
certain vulnerabilities such as viruses, denial of service attacks, etc. Nevertheless, IS is about more than
technology [41], because information systems involve
human beings, and users do not always act the way
they are supposed to [3]. Against this backdrop, the
next section introduces the historical importance of the
human factor in IS. We end with a summary of our
research questions and an explanation of the structure
of the paper.

2. Introduction: Human Actors and IS
A lack of understanding of security issues coupled
with the pervasive use of computers makes employees
a “critical factor” in the IS equation [20]. However, as
Dark points out, knowledgeable human beings are better at preventing IS breaches that occur due to negligence or accident as well as those that stem from malicious activity and the anomalous behavior of systems. They can efficiently and effectively respond to
incidents by reporting them promptly, quarantining
problems, and diagnosing and treating these problems
correctly [20]. Thus, technology solutions alone are
not sufficient to ensure IS countermeasures. This addresses the challenges of IS management (ISM) in organizations, because management and behavioral aspects are pivotal to building an ISMS in organizations
[62]. To protect the organizational assets, including
user information and systems, the human side of security should also be managed [37, 67], as is particularly
evident in social engineering (SE) attacks [77]. The
human element plays a significant role in the successful delivery of IS in today’s organizations, and security
behavior is greatly influenced by employees’ personal
perceptions of risk. However, these perceptions can be
changed [6].
Solms [74] discusses the development of IS in
terms of five “waves”: his third (institutional) wave,
which includes questions about IS policy, brought the
role of the employee as an end user of the system into
the spotlight, and the importance of the human dimension within IS was accepted [74]. This development
was pushed in the fourth wave with growing emphasis
on IS Awareness (ISA) and the risk posed by uninformed employees, who might compromise IS
measures. There is one main difference between
Solms’s fourth (IS governance) and fifth (cybersecurity) wave: organizations rolled out more and more systems based on the Internet and its services, making it

possible for millions of clients and customers to use
such systems externally without an adequate IS [74].
One direct result was that criminals shifted their attention to the end user under their new motto: “Do not try
to hack into the company’s IT systems; it may be very
difficult—go for the naïve end user!” [74].
This is why the human factor in IS has often been
seen as “critical” or the “weakest link” or the “greatest
threat” in the safety chain, especially because the majority of incidents of information or data collision in
organizations are due to unconscious behavior or the
deliberate fault of employees [7, 21, 23, 27, 72]. However, in the recent past, a rethink has started highlighting the strength of human actors as a security factor in
an organization-wide ISMS as well as the need for
ISA. For example, Elliot emphasized the idea of doing
security with the organization and not to it [22]. Winkler turned against critics who claim that consciousness efforts are useless. She showed how technology,
process, and awareness should combine to stop human
failings, and that if a single user action can compromise an entire security program, the problem is the security program itself [76]. Moreover, one should differentiate between the sensitization and training of employees [8]. “Security communication, education, and
training (CET) is meant to align employee behavior
with the security goals of the organization, but it is not
always designed in a way that can achieve this” [6]. In
our paper we will come back to this point. What does
ISA really mean? And how should security CET be
designed to achieve lasting behavioral change in people? The objective of this paper is a systematic compilation of past scientific insights into ISA and a possible
transfer of these insights into practical implementation. Our research questions (RQ) are as follows:
RQ#1: What is ISA actually? What factors are used
in the scientific literature to define it? How can the correlation to an organizational IS culture be interpreted
and rules for livable security created?
RQ#2: What are the dependencies/connections/
correlations between these factors and the ISA in practice? What are the consequences for individual and organizational learning processes in the area of IS?
RQ#3: What and how is ISA measured? How is
ISA related to IS compliance?
RQ#4: How can ISA trainings (ISAT) be designed
in practice to be efficient, effective, and sustainable?
What methods are relevant from a scientific point of
view?
In section three we review the relevant scientific
literature relating to ISA aspects, IS culture, and ISA
measurements, theories, and trainings. Section four
summarizes the discussion surrounding our RQ and
their further ramifications. Our conclusions and future
work are presented in section five.
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3. Literature Review
We reviewed the publications of leading academic
journals in the area of IS over the past decade. We focused our research on studies of the “human factor”.
The purpose was to identify the main research interests
and to derive impact for practice and future research.

3.1. KAB: knowledge, attitude, behavior
The idea of considering the user as the “weakest link”
in IS can be found in the large volume of studies that
try to explain employee adherence to or noncompliance with IS. The concept of ISA is widely used here.
But at the same time this concept is defined differently
in the literature. An important step toward a contemporary and conceptualized definition of ISA has been
made through the naming of the three dimensions of
knowledge, attitude, and behavior—also known as the
KAB model [40]. The proposition is that ISA comes
out of what employees or users know about IS and its
vulnerabilities, what they think or what opinion they
have about it, and their actual behavior in this context.
This model has been adopted by other researchers and
modified [47, 49].
In using the KAB model, the question arose as to
whether knowledge and attitudes are directly connected to behavior or if this influence is only assumed.
Some authors answered that question with “knowing
is doing” and filled the knowing-and-doing gap [16,
47] by showing, on an organization’s management
level, that managerial ISA and managerial actions toward IS are positively connected.
A large spectrum of theories has been consulted in
this research field to obtain knowledge about the real
security behavior and influencing factors. The theories
most applied to explain IS behavior are the Theory of
Planned Behavior, General Deterrence Theory, Compliance Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, the
Technology Acceptance Model and the Theory of
Reasoned Action, Social Bond Theory, and Involvement Theory [4; 15; 17; 24; 42; 46; 47; 50; 56; 63; 65;
68].
Our literature review in the field of IS behavior reveals that companies’ information security efforts are
often threatened by employee negligence and insider
breaches [14]. The lack of ISA, ignorance, negligence,
apathy, mischief, and resistance are at the root of user
mistakes [56]. Herath and Rao find that employees underestimate the probability of security breaches [29].
The findings of Chu, Chau, and So suggest that misuse
may be both an intentional type of behavior and an unreasoned action [17]. However, the paper by Kruger,

Drevin, and Steyn indicates that divisions can be identified where guidance is needed and shows the specific
types of threats that users are exposed to [41]. And
Hanamura, Takemura, and Komatsu conclude that the
ability to collect and process information and ISA decrease the probability that an individual will encounter
information security incidents, but overconfidence regarding information security knowledge increases the
probability of phishing and spoofing [28]. However,
the constructs of organizational impact and attacker
assessment generated stronger path coefficients with
ISA than technical knowledge [46]. Their research
model results also indicate that ISA is strongly associated with IS risk [46]. And Pattinson et al. found a
strong correlation with ISA for the measure relating to
the three behaviors Internet use, mobile computing,
and email use [50]. However, Parsons et al. conclude
that even if there is a reasonable level of ISA overall,
weaknesses were identified in the use of wireless technology, the reporting of security incidents, and the use
of social networking sites [49].
In the German banking sector, Bauer and Bernroider find strong empirical evidence showing the importance of ISA programs, protection motivation, and
monitoring [4], while the findings of Fagade and
Tryfonas suggest that security by compliance as a
campaign to secure information assets in Nigerian financial institutions is a far-fetched approach [24]. This
might relate to sociocultural influences on ISA.
McCrohan, Engel, and Harvey confirm that when users were educated about the threats to e-commerce and
trained in proper security practices, their behavior
could be changed to enhance online security for themselves and the firms where they are employed [45].
While one of the most significant findings of a
study in Turkey is that the higher the education level,
the more ISA there is [48], Ngoqo and Flowerday illustrate the poor security behavior among student mobile phone users, despite courses covering certain principles relating to information security [47]. The survey
of Slusky and Partow-Navid revealed that the major
problem with the ISA of students is not a lack of security knowledge but the way that knowledge is applied
in real-world situations. The authors conclude that the
compliance with ISA is lower than the understanding
of it [64]. Kim also showed that college students understand the importance and the need for ISA training
(ISAT) but many of them do not participate in trainings [37]. Moreover, many student smartphone users
employ some security measures, but a high percentage
of them are ignoring potential risks [35]. This suggests
a need for increased education, training, and awareness at university level.
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3.2. Influencing factors / Antecedents
To reduce vulnerability to a variety of attacks, several
organizations have made ISA a top priority. However,
Shaw, Chen, and Harris see three main barriers to ISA
in organizations: the general level of security awareness, employees’ computer skills, and organizational
budgets [61]. As the reviewed literature shows, an important influencing factor in IS is not necessarily insufficient knowledge but rather the lack of compliance
with ISA and IS behavior [64]. Using the vocabulary
of the KAB model, this is the attitude or the will and
ability to convert the knowledge into IS-compliant behavior. Looking at antecedents of IS compliance, these
factors can be divided into individual and organizational levels.
For example, at the individual level, Flores et al.
show that computer experience at work, helpfulness,
and gender had a significant correlation with behavior
reported by respondents in the scenario-based survey
[25]. Significant differences between the genders are
also seen vis-à-vis the intention to comply with data
protection regulations in German hospitals [26]. The
general results of Foth suggest that psychological factors, such as attitude, subjective norms, and perceived
behavior control, play an important part [26]. The
findings of Safa, von Solms, and Furnell show that
commitment and personal norms affect employee attitudes, and that the attitude toward compliance with IS
organizational policies also has a significant effect on
the behavioral intention regarding IS compliance [56].
At this point, it is important to identify the role of
top management. The top management can play a proactive role in shaping employee compliance behavior
[31]. Moreover, managers should compartmentalize
roles and allocate information on a “need to know” basis [75]. Managers should ensure that employees fully
understand what behaviors are expected, how their behaviors will be evaluated, and what rewards they may
receive if they perform these behaviors. This
knowledge can be shared through effective security
education, training, and awareness initiatives [30]. The
IT managers could pair new employees with mentors,
organize group learning exercises, and facilitate onthe-job training to enhance the practical learning of information privacy procedures [75]. Formal or informal
mechanisms can be provided to enhance interaction
among employees. Frequent interaction is the basis for
forming interpersonal rapport and psychological attachment [30].
Siponen, Pahnila, and Mahmood show that threat
appraisal, self-efficacy, and response efficacy have a
significant impact on the intention to comply with IS
policies, and that sanctions have a significant impact
on actual compliance with IS policies. The stronger the

intention to engage in the behavior, the more likely it
is to be performed [63]. The results of Herath and Rao
suggest firstly that threat perceptions about the severity of breaches and response perceptions relating to response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs are
likely to affect policy attitudes. Secondly organizational commitment and social influence have a significant impact on compliance intentions; and, thirdly, resource availability is a significant factor in enhancing
self-efficacy, which, in turn, is a significant predictor
of policy compliance intentions [29].
Boss et al. [7] examine elements of control and
conclude that the perception of mandatoriness is effective in motivating individuals to take security precautions, so if individuals believe that management is
watching, they will comply. In contrast to a previous
study, Liang, Xue, and Wu reveal that punishment expectancy is a strong determinant of compliance behavior, while reward expectancy is not significant [43]. In
line with these findings, Chen, Ramamurthy, and Wen
indicate that when punishment is severe, adding a remunerative control mechanism may not overly affect
compliance [15].
By contrast, for Kirlappos, Beautement, and Sasse,
IS has adapted to the modern collaborative nature of
organizations and abandoned the “command-and-control” approaches of the past [38]. The authors state that
“whilst many organizations are aware that this ‘comply or die’ approach does not work for modern enterprises where employees collaborate, share, and show
initiative, they do not have an alternative approach to
fostering secure behavior” [38]. Moreover, a clear set
of IS principles needs to be identified and communicated to develop employees who are risk-aware and
know how to manage the risks that apply to them [38].
Based on the research into IS knowledge sharing [56],
collaboration, intervention, and experience have a significant effect on the attitude of employees toward
compliance with organizational information security
policies.
In addition, the results produced by Sun, Ahluwalia, and Koong revealed a nonlinear relationship between security levels and information security readiness (ISR) [68]. In a general way, ISA programs may
generate a false sense of security, as taking part in ISA
programs reduces perceptions of vulnerability, while
the intentions for compliant security behavior are not
affected [4].
However, Tsohou et al. argue that ISA processes
are associated with interrelated changes that occur at
the organizational, technological, and individual levels
[71]. This is also shown by Da Veiga, who found
firstly that the overall IS culture average scores, as
well as individual statements, were significantly more
positive for employees who had read the IS policy
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compared with employees who had not, and secondly
that the overall IS culture also improved from one assessment to the next [19].
The summary research results show that a variety
of nonlinear, complex interactions influence the behavior of humans with respect to IS. Likewise, necessary changes in approach in modern organizations are
clarified. There is a clear need for further work in the
field of ISA and end-user security behaviors.

3.3. IS Awareness Training (ISAT)
Awareness remains a critical issue of IS [69]. Increasing the level of users’ security awareness through education and training may be an effective way to encourage the adoption of security tools, which leads to
safer technology use [34]. However, the importance of
appropriate awareness and training is often overlooked
[44], although scientific research indicates a general
need for (cyberthreat) education and training [35, 37,
45, 61]. Furthermore, Tsohou et al. conclude that “recent global security surveys indicate that security
training and awareness programs are not working”
[70]. Our review of the scientific literature shows that
the design of the ISA trainings has not been the subject
of significant research. Only a few studies from the literature on KAB give (very general) recommendations
for the design of training measures [50, 64].
Why have mainstream ISA techniques failed? One
aspect might be a “technocratic” view of risk communication, meaning the tendency for technical experts to
tell people what they think and ought to know [65].
Moreover, it might ignore the daily mix and overlap
between work and home and therefore ignore an insight from practice that “if you don’t change home security behavior, it is hugely more difficult to effect
change in the office” (Ian Kilpatrick, chairman of the
Wick Hill Group) [13]. A second aspect might be policies “ending up as long lists of dos and don’ts located
on web pages most employees only access when they
have to complete their mandatory annual ‘security
training’ and which has little to no effect on their security behavior” [38]. A third aspect relating to IS
campaigns is that a training with the hope of addressing security awareness gaps cannot be sufficient to ensure compliance with security culture [24]. Moreover,
the Dimensional Research Survey showed in 2011 that
companies were lacking proactive ongoing trainings
for employees and more than 30 percent did not currently make any attempt to educate employees [37]. In
the field of ISA, current information security awareness activities fail [33] and CET approaches are far
3

from efficient. Nevertheless, Shaw, Chen, and Harris
[62] report on a laboratory experiment that investigates the impacts of hypermedia, multimedia, and hypertext on increasing ISA on the three awareness levels (perception, comprehension, and projection) in an
online training environment with meaningful ISA materials [61].
The secret is to engage your people in the right
way, so they can convert learning into tangible action
and new behavior [6]. Research shows that besides the
theoretical approach of knowledge transfer and the
promotional approach of emotionality a systematic
communicational approach in the form of team-based
applications is needed to achieve lasting ISA that results in the intention and behavior to protect confidential information [36, 54]. The combination of these
three approaches is called ISAT 3.0 [60]. This corresponds to the idea that ISA is role-based learning, detailing the roles and responsibilities of a user in the use
of ICT systems within their organization [14] and may
be based on situational learning as an effective usercentered approach.
Besides situational target orientation, ISAT needs
individual emotionality and team-based communication and exchange for motivation. To achieve this, creative techniques and digital and analogue serious
games become more important in the field of IS, ISA,
and ISAT. Prime examples of this are the software
“Operation Digital Chameleon” [55], a card game,
where the staff members target the topic of SE [5] and
the “Security Parcours”3 of the company T-Systems
developed in cooperation with the firm known_sense.

3.4. Measuring awareness
At the very least, the common goal is to achieve a
change in human behavior to create more IS. However, most employees will not adopt security behaviors that severely hamper their ability to perform primary tasks [6]. Before mandating a certain security behavior, the organization needs to ensure that behavior
can be complied with, without routinely blocking
productivity—a step called “security hygiene” [52]. IS
awareness-raising measures and their evaluation
should be an indispensable part of today’s organizations. However, in an international survey with 369 respondents (70 percent from US-based organizations
and 30 percent from outside the United States) 26.6
percent indicated that they do not use any metrics to
measure their awareness program [57]. The most common methods and their advantages and disadvantages

https://sicherheit.eco.de/2013/events/security-parcours.html [accessed June 4, 2017]
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are summarized and discussed in [58]. But before appropriate measures for assessing the effectiveness of
IS awareness-raising programs can be chosen, organizations should consider which metrics they want to use
to monitor the effectiveness of the programs applied
[58].

3.5. Information security culture
At this point one should also question the relationship
of ISA to the security culture of the organization. Van
Niekerk and Solms explain the development of organizational culture at three levels [72]: level one shows
only the “artifacts.” At level two the “espoused values” are considered, meaning the organization’s official viewpoints, which give a deeper insight into the
reasons, thoughts, and perceptions that drive the observable behavior. The third level is called “shared
tacit assumptions” and reveals those values, beliefs,
and assumptions that have become shared and taken
for granted in an organization. These shared tacit assumptions result from a joint learning process [72].
Moreover, for Beyer et al. [6] it is necessary to use an
approach that motivates employees to play an active
role in corporate security. “Employees should understand what to protect, why they should want to protect
it, how the organization can help them with this, and
how successes and mistakes can be used as opportunities to learn and improve” [6].

4. Discussion, RQ, and Consequences
RQ#1: Although there is no uniform and binding definition of ISA, many articles in the international scientific literature are based on the KAB model and show
that knowledge/education about the IS of users is a basis for reflecting on their own attitudes. The overall
goal of most literature in this context is a better understanding of people’s behavior as a means to develop it
in the proper way.
There is, however, no simple linear cause-and-effect relationship between knowledge and attitudes, and
certainly not with regard to the real IS behavior practiced by people. A main problem for human beings
seems to be the application of IS knowledge in realworld situations. It seems that commitment and personal norms affect employees’ attitudes. In addition to
the proactive role of management, employees themselves must decide how to implement IS in their own
specific work contexts and this needs higher-level ISA
skills and intention as a motivational factor. Moreover,
there is no doubt that psychological factors, subjective
norms, and the sociocultural and gender background

in nonlinear and complex interactions have a major influence on human ISA and IS behavior.
In the context of the practices currently being examined, rewards and incentives such as remuneration
rules are hardly ever used as an enforcement mechanism for IS. It is, however, to be expected that the
“comply or die” approach [38] that has hitherto been
practiced will work less and less for modern organizations.
RQ#2: The improvement of perception and comprehension can advance a person’s ability to project
real-life situations. And it seems that the constructs of
organizational impact and attacker assessment have a
stronger influence on the ISA than technical
knowledge. Management and employees have to learn
their pivotal role for the IS of an organization.
Thus, the learning process in organizations must be
based on the user-centered approach, paying attention
to target groups, gender, and culture, which is based
on individual knowledge and skills as well as on concrete work connections. The user-centered approach
should also enable exchange in informal learning processes in certain social conditions within the organizational setting. The integration of formal and informal
mechanisms can enhance the interaction between employees. Frequent interaction is the basis for the formation of interpersonal relationships and psychological attachment to the organization. Since threat analysis, self-efficacy, and response effectiveness have a
significant impact on the intention to comply with the
IS guidelines, such aspects of emotionalization and
motivation should be incorporated into the sensitization to and training of ISA.
We have developed the spiral of transformative interaction between an organization and its staff with regard to (IS) learning processes (see fig. 1 and [59]).
The spiral shows the interaction between top-down
specifications and individual bottom-up influences on
the establishment of a future-oriented modern organizational security culture.
RQ#3: With regard to the third complex of research questions, we found that only a few organizations use different metrics for a deeper and continuous
measurement of their awareness program [58]. However, ISAT should be ongoing as the organization
changes and employees move into and across roles,
with a focus on what is necessary for their jobs [39].
Therefore, ISAT should not overwhelm employees
with information or take up excessive paid work time
[72].
It seems that attitudes toward compliance with IS
organizational policies also have a significant effect on
the behavioral intention regarding IS compliance,
whereby policies must be livable. Here the top man-
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agement must play a proactive role in shaping employees’ compliance with IS behavior. Advice should be
seen as an enabler that supports the organization’s
goals [6].
Creating an effective ISA program requires targeted communication and training that caters to specific
employee groups. The optimal IS culture must be carefully defined in each case. If this is not done explicitly,
staff may conclude that the organization lacks the
proper commitment to security. Rather than relying on
generalized computer-based packages, IS training
should be geared to the specific work environment.

ponent in this third stage of awareness-raising activities based on psychological theories [60]. Integrated
analogue and digital game-based ISAT with interactive elements leads to the further involvement of human actors. Our own extensive experience with such
learning materials and methods in projects and events
suggests that ISA and associated knowledge could be
improved in almost all participants and behavioral
changes triggered. To this end, we have proposed a future project with a correspondingly extensive organization-oriented measurement scenario, designed for a
systematic study.

5. Conclusion and Outlook

Fig 1 Spiral of transformative interaction

RQ#4: The fourth complex of research questions
aims to provide concrete instructions for the design of
the ISAT and useful learning methods. Game-based
learning is increasingly viewed as an effective method
for teaching and learning in education. It is especially
effective as a means to stimulate motivation and
change behavior and should be explicitly used for ISA.
In this way, learners directly see the consequences of
their actions and can get a sense of their knowledge
level in dialogue. Games also support IS abilities that
we increasingly need in daily life and in the workplace—for example, communication, cooperation, social interaction, and creativity. The emotional level
should be explicitly addressed, because social participation in a communicative team process is a key com-

The extensive research of scientific literature on the
subject of ISA shows a wide range of studies and specific theories, mainly taking the point of view that human actors are the weakest link [44] in IS and geared
to creating a better understanding of the factors influencing their IS behavior. However, we must overcome
this misleading perception and realize that employees
are a strong security and safety barrier, especially in
the area of SE attacks. For IS “human beings are an
essential part of the prevention, detection, and response cycle” [20]. It is therefore very important to
provide humans with the knowledge, attitudes, intention, and skills to behave in a security-oriented way
and build up ISA. The need for more intensive ISAT
is postulated from the research, but ways of making
such trainings effective and sustainable are not really
addressed.
Studies show that frequently used awareness-raising and training measures, such as campaigns (e.g.,
flyers, brochures, posters, films), purely IT-based
trainings (e.g., web-based trainings, simple video
games), or the sharing of information in lectures, are
ineffective and do not lead to a lasting sense of security among the addressees [1, 18, 66]. Instead, training
that provides opportunities for personal communication and interaction is a promising means to promote
ISA and the triggering of security-related behavior. To
be effective, security training must be based in the
work context and address specific security needs, with
regular ongoing reminders of the key messages and
awareness campaigns tailored to employees’ needs
[6]. As a result, the acceptance of the corresponding
technical, organizational, individual, and administrative measures may also increase [1]. But there is no
shortcut to developing an effective ISAT program, because every organization must define for itself the security culture it seeks to promote [6].
Much of the research on ISA is about staff and stu-
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dents at the university level, with a certain amount focusing on company employees. There are few e-government studies, although public administrations have
electronically processed sensitive and critical information for decades. In order to overcome this limitation, we are particularly keen to stimulate projects in
this area. More research in the nonlinear and complex
field of ISA and ISAT is necessary.
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